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Abstract 
Because computers may contain or interact with sensitive information, they are often air-
gapped and in this way kept isolated and disconnected from the Internet. In recent years the 
ability of malware to communicate over an air-gap by transmitting sonic and ultrasonic signals 
from a computer speaker to a nearby receiver has been shown. In order to eliminate such 
acoustic channels, current best practice recommends the elimination of speakers (internal or 
external) in secure computers, thereby creating a so-called 'audio-gap'. 
In this paper, we present Fansmitter, a malware that can acoustically exfiltrate data from air-
gapped computers, even when audio hardware and speakers are not present. Our method 
utilizes the noise emitted from the CPU and chassis fans which are present in virtually every 
computer today. We show that a software can regulate the internal fans’ speed in order to 
control the acoustic waveform emitted from a computer. Binary data can be modulated and 
transmitted over these audio signals to a remote microphone (e.g., on a nearby mobile 
phone). We present Fansmitter’s design considerations, including acoustic signature analysis, 
data modulation, and data transmission. We also evaluate the acoustic channel, present our 
results, and discuss countermeasures. Using our method we successfully transmitted data 
from air-gapped computer without audio hardware, to a smartphone receiver in the same 
room. We demonstrated the effective transmission of encryption keys and passwords from a 
distance of zero to eight meters, with bit rate of up to 900 bits/hour. We show that our 
method can also be used to leak data from different types of IT equipment, embedded 
systems, and IoT devices that have no audio hardware, but contain fans of various types and 
sizes. 
1. Introduction 
Air-Gapped computers are kept physically isolated from the Internet or other less secure 
networks. Such isolation is often enforced when sensitive or confidential data is involved, in 
order to reduce the risk of data leakage. Military networks such as the Joint Worldwide 
Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) [1], as well as networks within financial 
organizations, critical infrastructure, and commercial industries [2] are known to be air-
gapped due to the sensitive data they handle. Despite the high degree of isolation, even air-
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gapped network have been breached in recent years. While most famous cases are Stuxnet 
[3] and agent.btz [4], other cases have also been reported [5] [6].   
While the breach of such systems has been shown to be feasible in recent years, the 
exfiltration of data from non-networked computers or those without physical access is still 
considered a challenging task. Different types of out-of-band covert channels have been 
proposed over the years, exploring the feasibility of data exfiltration through an air-gap. 
Electromagnetic methods that exploit electromagnetic radiation from different components 
of the computer [7] [8] [9] [10] are likely the oldest kind of covert channel researched. Other 
type of optical [11] and thermal [12] out-of-band channels have also been suggested.  
Exfiltration of data using audible and inaudible sound has been proposed and explored by [13] 
[14] [15]. The existing method suggests transmitting data though the air-gap via high 
frequency soundwaves emitted from computer speakers. For example, the work in [14] 
demonstrates a malware (keylogger) that covertly transmits keystroke data through near-
ultrasonic audio emitted from laptop speakers. Interestingly, in 2013 security researchers 
claimed to find BIOS level malware in the wild (dubbed BadBios) which communicates 
between air-gapped laptops using ultrasonic sound [16].  
1.1. Speakerless, audioless computers 
Acoustic covert channels rely on the presence of audio hardware and a speaker in the 
transmitter computer. To that end, common practices and security policies prohibit the use 
of speakers and microphones in a secure computer, in order to create a so-called 'audio-gap' 
[17] [18]. Motherboard audio support may also be disabled in the BIOS to cope with the 
accidental attachment of speakers to the line out connectors. Obviously, disabling audio 
hardware and keeping speakers disconnected from sensitive computers can effectively 
mitigate the acoustic covert channels presented thus far [19].   
In this paper we introduce an acoustic channel which doesn't require a speaker or other audio 
related hardware to be installed in the infected computer. We show that the noise emitted 
from a computer’s internal CPU and chassis cooling fans can be intentionally controlled by 
software. For example, a malicious code on a contaminated computer can intentionally 
regulate the speed of a computer’s cooling fans to indirectly control its acoustic waveform. In 
this way, sensitive data (e.g., encryption keys and passwords) can be modulated and 
transmitted over the acoustic channel. These signals can then be received by a remote 
microphone (e.g., via a nearby smartphone), and be decoded and sent to an attacker. Our new 
method is applicable for a variety of computers and devices equipped with internal fans, 
including devices such as servers, printers, industrial and legacy systems, and Internet of 
Things (IoT) devices.  
2. Related Work 
Covert channels have been widely discussed in professional literature [20] [21] [22]. Our work 
focuses on covert channels that can exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers without 
requiring network connectivity. Over the years different types of out-of-band covert channels 
have been proposed, aimed at bridging air-gap isolation. The proposed methods can be 
categorized into electromagnetic, optic, thermal, and acoustic covert channels. 
Electromagnetic emissions are probably the oldest type of covert channels that have been 
explored academically. Kuhn and Anderson [7], in a pioneer works in this field, discuss hidden 
data transmission using electromagnetic emissions from a video card. Thiele [23]  utilizes the 
computer monitor to transmit radio signals to a nearby AM receiver. AirHopper [24] exploits 
video card emissions to bridge the air-gap between isolated computers and nearby mobile 
phones. GSMem [10], Funthenna [25], and Savat [26] introduce attack scenarios in which 
attackers can use different sources of electromagnetic radiation from a computer's 
motherboard, as covert exfiltration channels. Kasmi et al discuss intentional generation of 
electromagnetic energy in power networks to establish a command and control covert 
channel with computers [27]. More recently, Matyunin et al propose using the magnetic field 
sensors of mobile devices as a covert channel [28]. Loughry and Umphress [11] discuss 
information leakage from keyboard LEDs through optical emanations. Shamir et al 
demonstrated how to establish a covert channel with a malware through the air-gap using 
remote laser and scanners [29]. BitWhisper [30] demonstrates a covert communication 
channel between computers via exchange of so-called 'thermal-pings.' Characterizing and 
measuring out-of-band covert channels has been discussed in [31] [32]. 
2.1. Acoustical methods 
Madhavapeddy et al [15] discuss 'audio networking,' which allows data transmission between 
a pair of desktop computers, using 10 dollar speakers and a microphone. In 2013, Hanspach 
and Goetz [33] extend a method for near-ultrasonic covert networking between air-gapped 
computers using speakers and microphones. They create a mesh network and use it to 
implement an air-gapped key-logger to demonstrate the covert channel. The concept of 
communicating over inaudible sounds has been comprehensively examined by Lee et al [13], 
and has also been extended for different scenarios using laptops and smartphones [34] . Table 
1 summarizes the different types of covert channels for air-gapped computers, including our 
Fansmitter method. 
Table 1. Different types of covert channels for air-gapped computers. 
Method Examples Transmitter Comments 
Electromagnetic [7] [8] [10] [25] [26]  [24] 
Internal computer components  
Optical [11] [29]  LEDs  Thermal [12] CPU, GPU   Acoustic [14] [13] [34] [35] Internal or external  computer Speaker Audio hardware and speakers are required. 
Fansmitter (this paper)  Computer fans No need for audio hardware or speakers. 
 
As can be seen, existing acoustic methods require the installation of an external or internal 
speaker in the transmitting computer. This is considered a restrictive demand, because in 
many cases, speakers are forbidden on air-gapped computers based on regulations and 
security practices [17]. On the other hand, with our method the transmitting computer does 
not need to be equipped with audio hardware or an internal or external speaker. 
3. Attack Model 
Although Fansmitter makes a general contribution to the field of acoustic covert channels, like 
other works which present out-of-band covert channels [14] [13] [24], we propose Fansmitter 
as a method of exfiltrating information from air-gapped computers. Similar to other covert 
communication channels, the adversarial attack model consists of a transmitter and a receiver. 
Typically in our scenarios, the transmitter is an ordinary desktop computer, and the receiver 
is a nearby mobile phone (Figure 1). In a preliminary stage, the transmitter and receiver would 
have been compromised by the attacker. Infecting a highly secure network can be 
accomplished, as demonstrated by the attacks involving Stuxnet [36], Agent.Btz [37], and 
others [38] [39] [40]. In our case, the infected computer must be equipped with an internal 
CPU or chassis fan, a situation which exists in virtually every computer today. Infecting a 
mobile phone is a much less challenging task and can be done via many different attack 
vectors, using emails, SMS/MMS, malicious apps, and so on [41] [42] [43] [44].   
 
Figure 1. A typical exfiltration scenario. A compromised computer (A) - without speakers, and with audio hardware disabled - transmits sensitive information via acoustic signals. This information is received and decoded by a nearby mobile phone (B) 
 
Then the compromised computer gathers sensitive data (e.g., encryption keys) and modulates 
and transmits them using the acoustic soundwaves emitted from the computer’s internal fans. 
A nearby mobile phone receiver (also compromised) equipped with a microphone detects and 
receives the transmission, demodulates and decodes the data, and transfers it to the attacker 
via mobile data, SMS, or Wi-Fi. Note that in this paper, we demonstrate the attack model using 
a mobile phone receiver, a device which is commonly located in the vicinity of a computer. 
Other types of receivers are computers with microphone, laptops, and so on. 
4. Technical Background 
Different computer components including the CPU, RAM and GPU and others produce heat 
during normal use. These components must be kept within a specified temperature range in 
order to prevent overheating, malfunction, and damage. The fans are attached to other 
computer components and are aimed at accelerating the cooling these components by 
increasing air flow.  
Desktop computers are typically equipped with three to four types of fans (power supply unit, 
chassis, and CPU fans, as well as the optional graphics card fan). Figure 2 illustrates the 
location of the various fans in a computer. 
 
 
Figure 2. Fan locations within a standard workstation (additional details below) 
The PSU (power supply unit) fan (Figure 2, A). This fan is integrated into the PSU at its rear 
part. It is used as an exhaust fan to expel warm air from the PSU which produces heat. This 
type of fan is managed by an internal controller and usually cannot be monitored, controlled, 
or regulated by software. 
The Chassis fan (Figure 2, B). This fan is installed on the side or at the rear of the computer 
case. It usually draws in cold air from outside the computer and expels it through the top or 
rear of the computer.   
The CPU fan (Figure 2, C). This fan is mounted on top of the CPU socket. It cools the CPU's 
heatsink. 
The GPU (computer graphics card) fan. Due to the high power consumption and heat 
emission of modern graphics cards, dedicated cooling fans are installed. Like CPU fans, they 
are mounted to the heatsink of the GPU. 
In addition, there are other fans which are less common, such as: HD, PCI, optical driver, and 
memory slot fans. These fans can be seen on servers or legacy equipment. 
In this paper we focus on CPU and chassis fans. These fans are guaranteed to be present in 
every computer, making Fansmitter a threat to virtually every computer. The PSU fan has been 
omitted from our discussions due to its complete separation from the motherboard.  
4.1. Fan control 
Chassis and processor fans use either three or four wire (female) connectors, which are 
connected to three or four pin headers on the motherboard. Table 2 lists the four wires and 
their functionality. Note that most modern motherboards are shipped with four wire CPU and 
chassis fans.  
Table 2. Connectors of four wire fans and their functionality 
Pin Symbol Function 1 (red) GROUND Ground wire 2 (black) 12 V 12 V fan powering 3 (black) FAN_TACH Output signal reporting the fan speed 4 (yellow) FAN_CONTROL Input signal, allows adjustment of the fan speed  
As can be seen, the third wire is used as an output signal, which continuously reports the fan 
speed to the motherboard. The fourth wire is used as an input signal, allowing setting and 
adjustment of the fan speed via a pulse-width modulation signal (PWM) [45]. In older three 
wire fans, the FAN_CONTROL wire is not present, and hence fan speed is not controllable. 
The speed of CPU and chassis fans can be managed automatically or manually. With automatic 
management, the fan speed is regulated by a controller in the motherboard. The controller 
increases and decreases the fan speed according to the current temperature. Manual 
management can override the current fan speed and set it using the fan control input signal. 
Setting the fan speed manually is usually done via the BIOS interface or from within the OS, if 
an appropriate driver to access the appropriate bus has been installed. There are several 
open-source and propriety programs aimed at controlling and monitoring fan speed in 
different motherboards for Windows, Linux, and Mac OSs [46] [47] [48]. 
5. Fan Rotation and Acoustic Signal 
Computer fan rotation, measured in revolutions per minute (RPM) units, emits acoustic noise 
at various frequencies and strength. Typical computer fan speeds range from a few hundred 
revolutions per minute to a few thousand RPMs. The noise is caused by the movement of the 
fan blades, each of which pushes air in its path, and together their movements create a 
compression wave with some amount of rarefaction. The noise level depends on the air flow, 
mechanics, and vibrations which are mainly determined by the location, size, number of 
blades and the current RPM of the rotating fan. Because the location, size, and number of 
blades of a fan are fixed, the current RPM is the main factor which determines the noise level. 
It is known that fan noise (in dB) increases with the fifth power of the fan rotation speed [49], 
hence changes in the fan’s RPM cause an immediate change to the noise emitted. 
 
 Figure 3 displays the waveforms produced by accelerating a computer CPU fan from 1000 RPM 
to 4500 RPM and back. The sounds produced were recorded by a mobile phone placed one 
meter (upper figure) and four meters (lower figure) away from the computer fan.  
Note that although the acoustic waveform may differ between various types of fans, the basic 
phenomenon observed in which an increased rate of fan rotation is associated with increased 
acoustic energy in the wave produced is common to all types of rotating fans [49]. This permits 
us to extend the concept presented in this paper to other types of fans in a variety of devices. 
5.1. Blade pass frequency   
Blade pass frequency (BPF) is the main acoustic tone generated by a running fan. More 
specifically, it is the tone frequency produced when the blades of the fan rotate past the 
turning vanes. The overall noise spectrum pattern of a fan’s noise can be broken down into 
several components for the purpose of analysis. The BPF itself, while not being a perfect 
sinusoidal wave, generates harmonics at multiples of its frequency. In addition, unsteady 
flows contribute with both noises spread around the BPF and high frequency broadband 
noise. 
BPF (in ܪݖ) is calculated by multiplying the number of blades (݊), with the rotating speed (ܴ) 
in revolutions per minute (RPM), so ܤܲܨ=݊ ∗ ܴ/60. 
 
 
Figure 3. The acoustic signal of a CPU fan, as recevied by mobile phone from a distance of 1m (upper figure) and 4m (lower figure) 
 
Figure 4. Typical BPF plot (R ~ 1000 RPM) 
Figure 4 illustrates a typical fan spectrum at about 1000 RPM. The BPF is indicated in red at 
around 120 ܪݖ, as expected for a seven blade fan.  
5.2. Signal processing 
In order to analyze the waveforms in the frequency domain we proceeded as follows. First, 
for simplicity, we downsampled the signals from the original 44.1 ݇ܪݖ sampling frequency 
recording to 2 ݇ܪݖ. The reduced sample rate is sufficient for the analysis of signals below 1 ݇ܪݖ (half of the sample rate as is prescribed by the Nyquist theorem), which is still above 
the expected acoustic tone corresponding to the rotation levels used, as explained above. 
Second, we bandpass filtered the signals around the expected BPF, namely from 400 to 600 ܪݖ. 
The BPF enables us to calculate the expected tone generated by the fan. It also allows us to 
use a frequency based modulation scheme. For example, since a typical chassis fan has seven 
blades (݊ ൌ 7), the expected BPF values for the ܴ ranges used in our experiments can be 
precalculated (see Table 3).  
Table 3. Expected BPF values for seven blade fans 
R (RPM) BPF (Hz) 
1000-1600 116-187 1600-3000 187-350 2000-2500 233-292 4000-4500 466-525 
5.3.  Channel stealth 
 Based on the BPF formula, a typical computer fan emits noise in the range of 100 to 600 ܪݖ, a frequency range which can be detected by the human ear. The fan’s emitted noise is noticeable at a high frequency range, because the noise level increases with the fifth power of the fan rotation speed [49]. By definition covert channels must work stealthily in order to avoid detection. There are three strategies which can be implemented to enable the channel to operate in stealth mode.  
1. Flexibility in terms of the time of the attack. The attacker may choose to start the transmissions at times when users are not working on the computer, or even present in the room (e.g., during evening hours). Note that this strategy works with some attack models [11] [29]. This relevant also in cases in which the attacker has a persistent microphone in the room, such as other computers equipped with a microphone.  2. The use of low frequencies. Modulating the data over lower frequencies (e.g., 140 –  170 ܪݖ) appears to be less noticeable by users, especially when the receiver is 
located at short distance from the transmitting computer. In some scenarios, an 
attacker may choose to only use low frequencies for the transmissions. 
 
3. The use of close frequencies. Modulating the data over change of close frequencies 
(e.g., less than a 100 ܪݖ difference between 0 and 1) is also less noticeable by a user, 
as it blends in and appears as natural background environmental noise.   
 6. Data Modulation 
To encode digital information over the fan's acoustic signal, the data must be modulated. In 
our case we modulate the binary data over a soundwave carrier:  the fan sound waveform. 
We use two types of modulation schemes: (1) Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK), and (2) Frequency 
Shift Keying (FSK). FSK modulation is faster and more resilient to environmental noises than 
ASK, while ASK is more resilient to the type of fan in use and its blade pass frequency 
properties than FSK. Generally, we use FSK when the generic type of transmitting fan is known 
in advance, and ASK is used when the type of fan or its properties are unknown to the attacker. 
The modulation schemes, in context of our covert channel, are described below. 
6.1. Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) 
In Amplitude Shift Keying modulation we assign distinct amplitude levels of the carrier wave 
to represent distinct values of binary data. We use the binary version of ASK (B-ASK), in which 
two distinct amplitudes, ܣ଴ and ܣଵ, represent '0' or '1.' We control the carrier amplitudes in a carrier frequency, ܨ௖ (ܨ௔  to ܨ௕), by controlling the fan so that it rotates at two speeds, ܴ଴ and ܴଵ. Rotation at ܴଵ results in a carrier amplitude of ܣ଴ (a logical '0'), while rotation at R1 results in a carrier amplitude of ܣଵ (a logical '1'). Table 4 provides a summary of the parameters of ASK modulation.  
Table 4. B-ASK modulation 
RPM Soundwave Amplitude Duration Carrier Freq. Represent 
ࡾ૙ ܣ0   ܶ ܨܿ (ܨܽ to ܨ௕) "0" ࡾ૚ ܣ1 ܶ ܨܿ (ܨܽ to ܨ௕) "1"  
Figure 5 shows the ASK representation of '101010' modulated by the CPU fan of a desktop 
computer, as received by a nearby smartphone. In this case,  ܴ଴=3000 RPM, ܴଵ=3500 RPM, and ܶ=5 ݏ݁ܿ.  
 
Figure 5. ASK modulation of "101010" over 60 seconds, when R0=3000 RPM and R1=3500 RPM 
As noted in [49] ܴ଴ ൏ ܴଵ implies ܣ଴ ൏  ܣଵ. Practically, it means that higher RPM rates cause higher noise levels, and thus a higher amplitude carrier wave. Please note that this is a 
generalization for all CPU fans, and in reality, ܴ଴, ܴଵ, ܣ଴, ܣଵ, and ܨ௖ may vary for different types of fans.  
We only used two RPM rates so as to create two distinct amplitudes to modulate the data. 
We noticed that sometimes, particularly when the fan is operating at a high speed (e.g., during 
an heavy workload), it is more effective to assign '0' to high RPM rates and '1' to low RPM 
rates so that the base amplitude is the higher one.  
6.2. Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) 
In Frequency Shift Keying modulation, we assign distinct frequencies to represent distinct 
values of binary data. We use the binary version of FSK (B-FSK), in which two distinct 
frequencies, ܨ଴  and ܨଵ, represent '0' or '1' arbitrarily. As mentioned, the blade pass frequency is determined by the current RPM, and a change to the RPM implies a change to the current 
frequency. We maintain the frequency of the carrier by setting the fan to rotate at two speeds, ܴ଴ and ܴଵ. Rotation at ܴ଴ results in a carrier frequency of ܨ଴ (a logical '0'), while rotation at ܴଵ results in a carrier amplitude of ܨଵ (a logical '1'). Table 5 provides a summary of the parameters of FSK modulation.  
Table 5. B-FSK modulation 
RPM Carrier Freq. Duration Represent 
ࡾ૙ ܨ0 ܶ "0" ࡾ૚ ܨ1 ܶ "1"  
Figure 6 shows the FSK representation of '101010' modulated by the CPU fan of a desktop 
computer, as received by a nearby smartphone. In this case, ܴ଴=1000 RPM, ܴଵ=1600 RPM, and ܶ=5 ݏ݁ܿ.  
 
Figure 6. FSK modulation of "101010" over 150 seconds, when R0=1000 RPM and R1=1600 RPM 
Based on the BPF formula ܴ଴ ൏  ܴଵ implies ܨ଴ ൏  ܨଵ. Practically, it means that higher RPM rates cause a noticeable peak in higher frequencies. As in ASK, this is a generalized form to all 
CPU fans and ܴ଴, ܴଵ, ܨ଴, ܨଵ and may vary between different types of fans.  
6.3  Bit framing 
As explained in the previous sub-sections, the B-ASK and B-FSK modulation uses two 
amplitudes and frequencies, respectively, to represent the data. Two issues arise from this:  
(1) The amplitudes (in the case of ASK) and frequencies (in the case of FSK) encoding ('0' 
and '1') depends on the type of fan currently in use and on the exact RPM values used 
during the modulation. The receiver has no prior information regarding the 
parameters used by a nearby transmitting computer. 
(2) In the case of ASK, the level of the ܣ଴ and ܣଵ amplitudes is dependent on the current distance between the transmitting computer and the receiver. This means that if the 
receiver (e.g., mobile phone) is moving during a transmission, a ‘1’ and ‘0’ may be 
decoded incorrectly. 
To resolve these issues and assist the receiver in dynamically synchronizing with the 
transmitter parameters, we transmit data in small frames. Each frame consists of a preamble 
sequence of four bits and a payload of 12 bits (see Table 6).  
Table 6. A frame consisting of four bits of preamble, followed by a payload of 12 bits 
Preamble (4 bits) Payload (12 bits) 1010  111010101110  
The preamble consists of the '1010' sequence and is used by the receiver to determine the 
amplitude levels or frequency values of a '0' and a '1' in a periodic way. In addition, the 
preamble header allows the receiver to identify the beginning of a transmission in the area 
and extract other channel parameters, such as transmission time and carrier frequency.  
7. Results 
We evaluate Fansmitter with a CPU and chassis fan – two fans that exist on virtually every 
computer today. As noted, due to the acoustic property of computer fans, our method is 
applicable to other types of fans (e.g., GPU fans) as well. We used a standard desktop 
computer (DELL OptiPlex 9020) with Intel Core i7-4790 motherboard and Intel Q87 (Lynx 
Point) chipset, as a transmitter. As a receiver, and to represent an attack model scenario, we 
used a Samsung Galaxy S4 (I9500) mobile phone with a standard microphone with a sampling 
rate of 44.1 ݇ܪݖ. Our testing environment consisted of a computer lab with ordinary 
background noise, seven workstations, several network switches, and an active air 
conditioning system. In practice, the transmission time and bit rate are highly dependent on 
environmental noise which determines the signal-to-noise ratio (ܴܵܰ). A higher level of 
environmental noise reduces the bit rate and the channel capacity. The following results 
based on a distance of one, four, and eight meters between the transmitter and receiver are 
based the testing environment described above. 
 
Figure 7. CPU fan audio spectral views (1000-1600 RPM, 1 meter) 
Figure 7 depicts a payload (01010101) as received by a mobile phone within a short distance 
(1 meter) of the transmitting computer. Here we use B-FSK modulation with ܴ଴ ൌ1000 ܴܲܯ and ܴଵ ൌ 1600 ܴܲܯ. In this case, ܨ଴ ൎ 145 ܪݖ and ܨଵ ൎ 170 ܪݖ. The total transmission time was 180 seconds with ܶ ൌ 10 ݏ݁ܿ which implies an effective bit rate of 3 
bits/min. Note that the ܨ଴ is not the expected BPF for this specific RPM as shown in Table 3. In fact, the expected ܨ଴ is displayed as a continuous frequency peak in the spectrogram. A possible explanation for this may derive from low RPM values which lead to a less predictable 
noise spectrum. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. CPU fan audio spectral views (4000-4250 RPM, 1 meter) 
Figure 8 depicts a payload (01010101) as received by a mobile phone within a short distance 
of the transmitting computer. Here we use d B-FSK modulation with ܴ଴ ൌ 4000 ܴܲ  and ܴଵ ൌ 4250 ܴܲܯ. In this case, ܨ଴ ൎ 495 ܪݖ and ܨଵ ൎ 525 ܪݖ. The total transmission time was 32 sec with ܶ ൌ 0 ݏ݁ܿ (no delay) which implies an effective bit rate of 15 bits/min (900 
bits/hour). 
 
  
Figure 9. Fan audio, waveform, and spectral views (2000-2500 RPM, 4 meters) 
 
Figure 9 depicts a payload (01010101) as received by a mobile phone within a distance of 
four meters from the transmitting computer. Here we use d B-FSK modulation with ܴ଴ ൌ2000 ܴܲܯ and ܴଵ ൌ 2500 ܴܲܯ. In this case, ܨ଴ ൎ 261 ܪݖ and ܨଵ ൎ 294 ܪݖ. The total transmission time was 52 seconds with ܶ ൌ 0 ݏ݁ܿ (no delay) which implies an effective bit 
rate of 10 bits/min (600 bits/hour). 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Fan audio, waveform, and spectral views (4100-4500 RPM, 8 meters) 
Figure 10 depicts a payload (10101010) as received by a mobile phone within a distance of 
four meters from the transmitting computer. Here we use d B-FSK modulation with ܴ଴ ൌ4100 and ܴଵ ൌ 4500 ܴܲܯ. In this case, ܨ଴ ൎ 480ܪݖ  and ܨଵ ൎ 527 ܪݖ. The total transmission time was 48 sec with ܶ ൌ 0  ݏ݁ܿ (no delay) which implies an effective bit rate of 
10 bits/min (600 bits/hour). 
7.1. Bit rate 
The effective bit rate is determined by the time it takes the fan to transit between two level 
of speeds, and bit transmission time. Let ܶ be the duration (in seconds) of '0' and '1' 
transmissions. Let ܴܶ଴ିଵ be the time (in seconds) it takes the fan rotor to transfer from speed ܴ଴ to ܴଵ  and ܴܶଵି଴ be the time it takes the fan rotor to transfer from ܴଵ to ܴ଴. To simplify the calculations we assume that ܴܶ ൌ ܴܶ଴ିଵ ൌ ܴܶଵି଴. Then, the time it takes to transmit ݊ 
bits is ݐ ൎ  ݊ ∗ ሺܴܶ ൅ ܶሻ ஻௜௧௦ௌ௘௖௢௡ௗ. 
8. Countermeasures 
There are three main categories of countermeasures: procedural, software based, and 
physical or hardware based. 
In procedural countermeasures the zones [50] approach may be used. In this approach 
sensitive computers are kept in restricted areas in which mobile phones, microphones, and 
electronic equipment are banned. The zones approach (also referred to as the 'black-red 
separation' approach) is discussed in [51] as a means of handling various types of acoustic, 
electromagnetic and optical threats. However, zones are not always possible, due to practical 
reasons and space limitations. Software based countermeasures include the use of endpoint 
protection to detect malicious activities on the computer, and interfering with the fan control 
API and bus access. Such countermeasures have been shown to be porous [52] as an attacker 
can use rootkit techniques and other techniques to evade detection. Fan speed regulation by 
software (e.g., device driver) can regulate fan speed and therefore noise emission, hence 
preventing covert data modulation. Hardware based and physical countermeasures may 
include noise detectors which monitor soundwave at specific or range of frequencies. Such 
products exist [53] but are prone to false alerts from environmental noise. Jamming the fan 
signal by the generation of background noise [54] is also possible but not applicable in some 
environments, particularly in quiet settings. Physical isolation in which the computer chassis 
is built with special noise-blocker coverage is also an option, but this is costly and not practical 
on large-scale. Finally, replacing the fans with specialized quiet fans can limit the noise level, 
but even this does not completely prevent the emission of noise [49]. Moving to different 
types of cooling systems, such as water cooling or refrigeration can prevent acoustical 
emission, but this is also less practical for wide deployment. Table 7 summarizes the listed 
countermeasures, along with challenges of each. 
 
Table 7. Procedural, software, and hardware countermeasure 
Method Type Challenges 'Zones' separation Procedural Space limitations AV / monitoring Software Can be bypassed by rootkits or evasion techniques Fan regulation Software Can be bypassed by low-level malware  Noise detection Hardware False positives and false alarms Signal jamming Hardware Generate background noises Fan replacement, Water cooling, etc. Hardware Financial limitations Chassis isolation Physical Financial and space limitations  
9. Conclusion 
Past research has demonstrated that malware can exfiltrate information though an air-gap by 
transmitting audio signals from the internal or external speakers of desktop computers. In this 
paper, we propose a method that uses the noise emitted from computer fans as a medium 
for acoustic data exfiltration. We show that the acoustic waveform emitted from CPU and 
chassis fans of a desktop computer can be regulated and controlled. We also show that a 
malware can modulate information over the waveform and transmit it to a nearby receiver. 
We designed a simple amplitude and frequency based modulation scheme and tested it in an 
actual workplace setting with ordinary noise levels. Our tests shows that information be 
received by a smartphone (or a similar device with a microphone) from a distance of zero to 
eight meters and at a bit rate of up to 15 bits per minute. Using Fansmitter attackers can 
successfully exfiltrated passwords and encryption keys from a speakerless air-gapped 
computer to a mobile phone in the same room from various distances. Beyond desktop 
computers, our method is applicable to other kinds of audioless devices, equipped with 
cooling fans (various types and sizes of fans) such as printers, control systems, embedded 
devices, IoT devices, and more. 
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